<text id=00he1907><title>The Ghost of Dien Bien Phu</title>
<history>US Air Force: Events History</history>
<article><hdr>The Ghost of Dien Bien Phu</hdr><body>
<p>The village of Khe Sanh, in Quang Tri province, lay about 16 miles (25 km) south of the DMZ and 10 miles (16 km) from the Laotian border. The Army's Green Berets had built a combat base on a little plateau north of the village, using it as a jumping-off place for long-range reconnaissance patrols that moved around the Ho Chi Minh trail.
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<p>Otherwise it had no tactical value; it controlled no major road route. In fact, the combat base was completely dependent on air resupply. A Marine battalion moved in late in 1966, and a few months later the Green Berets left Khe Sanh for another location not far off.
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<p>A patrol of Marines ran into a small unit of North Vietnamese in April, and came back with the conclusion that an attack on the base was among the enemy plans. Two more battalions of Marines were sent to reinforce the base later that month. Still later, the 26th Marine Division arrived to replace the 3rd, and settled into the base to stay.
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<p>By late 1967, enemy activity against the outpost had forced the US command to a basic decision either to evacuate Khe Sanh, or to defend it against a possibly very heavy enemy onslaught. The spectre of the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu hung over the reality of Khe Sanh. President Johnson was one of the many troubled by the similarities between the two situations. There were important differences, though, and in the end they made the victory. First, the Marines had logistics support that the French could only have dreamed of, in terms of sizes and numbers of cargo aircraft available. Second, American firepower, both on the ground and in the air, was massive and, in the case of the latter, unlimited.
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<p>The decision was made that Khe Sanh would be defended, for political reasons. A minor outpost of no real tactical value was to become the symbol of American determination to win the war.
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<p>The weather, on average, was bad. There are two types of monsoons in Southeast Asia, at different seasons. North and South Vietnam are hit by complementary ones; when it is monsoon season up north, it is clear down south, and vice versa. Khe Sanh, in the middle, got both. The visibility was bad in the early morning and the late afternoon.
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<p>In addition to the weather hazards, any supply effort would have to run a gauntlet of fire from enemy anti-aircraft batteries on the ridges that lay parallel to the western approach to the small airstrip. The enemy had moved in on the high ground, and seemed to hold every advantage but one: air power.
